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Abstract 
Hannah Arendt’s Jewish writings were central to her thinking about the human condition 
and engaged with dialectics of modernity, universalism and identity. Her concept of the 
‘conscious pariah’ attempted both to define a role for the public intellectual and understand 
the relationship between Jews and modernity. Controversially she accused Jews of lack 
resistance to the Nazis and argued that their victimization resulted from apolitical 
‘worldlessness’.  We argue that although Arendt’s analysis was original and challenging, her 
characterization of Jewish history as one of ‘powerlessness’ is exaggerated but, more 
importantly, her underdeveloped concept of ‘the social’ is insensitive to the complex 
modalities of resistance and consciousness among subaltern Jewish communities. Further, 
her lack of interest in religious observance obscures the importance of Judaism as a 
resource for resistance. This is illustrated by ‘hidden transcripts’ of Jewish resistance from 
the early modern period.   




In recent years Arendt’s Jewish writings have received extensive attention and 
commentaries have brought out the richness of this work – from her biography of Rahel 
Varnhagen, through debates about Zionism in the 1930s to Eichmann in Jerusalem and the 
ensuing controversy in the 1960s. Indeed, for Kohn (2007: xxvii) ‘her experience as a Jew is 
literally the foundation of her thought’. These commentaries have also revealed how her 
‘Jewish’ works and her wider political philosophy were interconnected and interdependent 
such that one strand in her work cannot properly be understood apart from the others. This 
discussion begins with a critical account of Arendt’s concept of the ‘conscious pariah’ which 
is central to her understanding of the dilemmas of Jewish emancipation, her early Zionism 
and her concept of political action. The concept was closely connected to other strands in 
her work. First, there was the nineteenth-century ‘Jewish Question’, that is, on what terms 
would Jews be granted civil and political rights, if at all?  Drawing on Bernard Lazare, Arendt 
understood this question largely from the standpoint of secular rather than religious Jews in 
the context of the idea of the Rechtstaat. However, we suggest that her concept of Judaism 
wavers between a figurative ‘Judaizing’ that preoccupied Christian thought and reappears in 
secular form in post-enlightenment philosophy, and what one might call a sociological 
understanding of Jewish life.1 Secondly, her concept is grounded in her critique of 
‘wordlessness', that is, a refusal to engage with political action and choosing instead living 
with mystical utopias. This concept drew on Max Weber’s description of Jews as ein 
Pariavolk and debates in German sociology about the origins of capitalism but was also 
informed by her political existentialism. This discussion examines these issues and 
introduces evidence of everyday resistance among Jews in early modernity in which the Jew 
could be understood as a subaltern figure. We argue that this evidence points to ambivalent 
relations between Jews and the wider community that are more complex than Arendt’s 
essentially figurative dichotomy of the pariah/parvenu suggests. The discussion concludes 
by arguing that the concept is limited by her underdeveloped concept of the social 
combined with an exaggerated stress on autonomous political action, which was not 
sensitive to multiple modalities of resistance in the lifeworld.  
Pariah, Parvenu and ‘the Jewish Question’ 
Arendt’s concepts of political action and Jewish identity were framed by the nineteenth 
century (particularly German) ‘Jewish Question’ and subsequently by the Holocaust. She 
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was part of the generation of Jewish intellectuals, including Adorno, Horkheimer and 
Bauman, traumatized by the Zivilisationsbruch and who, as Ron Eyerman (2013) argues, 
were deeply affected by the violence that breached taken-for-granted realities. Although 
not included in Eyerman’s account, Arendt was similarly witness to the catastrophe that, he 
says, leaves wounds and memory scars that influence later behaviour in unpredictable 
ways2.  Documenting the extermination of Jews in occupied Europe, Arendt concluded that 
the inevitable choice, including for those such as herself, who escaped, was to resist or die3 
and, ‘[if] you are no longer willing to die for anything, you will die for having done nothing’ 
(Arendt 2007:163)4. These comments encapsulate Arendt’s call to Jews (and indeed all 
subaltern peoples) to abandon both accommodation with gentile society and the Diaspora 
condition of ‘worldlessness’. Jews must become instead ‘conscious pariahs’, willing to fight 
and organize politically as Jews – to demand rights that were not conditional upon 
abandoning Jewishness – an attempt that was anyway doomed to failure. 
Arendt’s rather Simmelian vignettes of the parvenu and pariah were developed with 
reference to the ‘Jewish Question’ in nineteenth-century Europe5. The French Revolution 
and Napoleonic edicts of Emancipation had offered civic rights, although this was a ‘hope 
and curse at same time’ (Sznaider 2010: 430). Clermont-Tonnere, Constituent Assembly 
deputy, defined the terms of emancipation when he stated in 1789 that Jews were 
‘welcome as individuals’ but ‘there will be no nation within a nation’, thereby excluding 
Jews from the nation state as Jews (Dreyfuss 2012). Arendt agreed with Gershom Scholem 
that European nations were thus not prepared to assimilate Jews without demanding that 
they alter their identity beyond recognition (Biale 1982:5). ‘Jews were’, Arendt says 
therefore ‘socially speaking, in the void’ (Arendt 1968: 14). Their position in the social 
hierarchy was quite different from the inequality of the class system because it arose from 
their relationship to the state through which Jews were either ‘over-privileged’ and 
protected or underprivileged (1968:14).  
Arendt’s understanding was framed by a wider view of Jews in Christian society. Her Jewish 
writings are characterised by a largely unacknowledged distinction that, following Nirenberg 
(2013) and Judaken (2012) one might call a figurative, imaginary Judaism, as opposed to the 
‘sociological Jew’. Imaginary Judaism serves as a trope in western Christian and 
Enlightenment thought and originates in the dichotomy between Christian spirituality and 
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Jewish corporeality being ‘of the flesh’ of Abraham. Further to ‘Judaize’ was to make an 
erroneous passage from ‘soul to flesh’, ‘spirit to matter’, ‘truth to appearance’ in which 
even converted Jews were often suspected of being crypto-Jews (Nirenberg 2013:57ff). This 
dispute with figurative ‘Judaism’ has been deployed to place Jews in a category of alterity 
while serving as a foil to legitimate Christian and later Enlightenment views. While for 
Christianity figurative Judaism was an enemy of revelation, for the philosophes and then for 
Hegel and Kant it was an enemy of reason (Nirenberg 2013:343). In a further twist, the 
image of Judaism was transmuted after the French Revolution by counter-revolutionaries 
such as Burke and Romantics like Fichte into the epitome of materialistic modernity. Here 
the outcome of the revolution would be the triumph of ‘Judaism’ in the forms of money-
jobbers6, usurers and parasitic huckstering. This figurative association of Judaism with 
capitalist modernity was replayed in the controversy between Bauer and Marx in the 1840s 
in which Jews were both enemies of reason and bearers of materialism. Marx appears to 
accept aspects of the then widespread antisemitic caricature of Jews as inveterate 
moneylenders and hucksters and Judentum is a metaphor for commerce. Throughout the 
essay the term is invested with double meaning – referring to Judaism both as a religion 
(‘the Sabbath Jew’) and grubby financial dealing. There are points where Marx makes it 
explicit that he does not dissent from Bauer’s stereotypical characterisation of Jews as 
Geldmenschen and a reactionary caste without history7.  Further, he argues that since Jews 
can be emancipated politically without abandoning Jewishness, political emancipation is not 
identical with human emancipation (Marx 1977:51). While the essay can be read as 
supporting Jewish legal emancipation (e.g. Fine 2014) and ‘political emancipation is of 
course a great progress’ (Marx 1977:47) this is also limited to rights within the bourgeois-
legal state that in due course will give way to full ‘human’ emancipation. What space there 
would then be for cultural particularity is unclear.  
Arendt’s position was ostensibly the reverse of this in that for her Jews must insist both on 
their ‘right to have rights’ while engaging politically as Jews. Hence her often-quoted maxim, 
‘If one is attacked as a Jew, one must defend oneself as a Jew. Not as a German, not as a 
world-citizen, not as an upholder of the Rights of Man’ (Arendt 2000:12). Indeed, for Arendt 
‘rights’ are meaningless without the guarantee of collective will to defend them. In this 
sense Durkheim’s ‘solution’ to the Jewish Question after Dreyfus – the institutionalization of 
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human rights as a new sacred object which would permit both social solidarity and the 
respect of difference (Durkheim 1973) – could not be Arendt’s solution. This was because 
for her ‘rights’ are always both inclusive and exclusive – they include those possessing right 
but exclude stateless, superfluous populations that grow in contemporary society. Rather as 
Agamben later argued, the logic of sovereignty coincided with the logic of exclusion and 
ban, since rights are bound up with the political entity of sovereign people (Lysaker, 2014). 
However, ‘to be uprooted means to have no place in the world, recognized and guaranteed 
by others; to be superfluous means not to belong to the world at all’ (Arendt 1979: 475).  
The twentieth century had shown that there was no guarantee of rights and that the utopia 
of assimilation had failed8.  
Although Arendt’s concept differed from Marx’s, the stereotypes of Jews noted above were 
not completely absent from her work either and it is not always clear whether she too is 
referring to figurative or actual Judaism. She links the alleged passivity of Diaspora Jews to 
their being materialistic, deceitful and lacking historical ties; their pursuit of individual 
advantage and seeking the protection of gentile authorities to which they were 
obsequiously grateful; and becoming ‘court Jews’ avoiding politics. Indeed, these ‘parvenus’ 
shared ‘inhumanity, greed, insolence, cringing servility and determination to push ahead’ 
(Arendt 1979:66). They embraced the status offered them by gentile society as ‘exceptions’ 
and thereby internalized antisemitism (1979:56). This is, to say the least, a figurative 
caricature9 and raises questions about the pariah-parvenu couplet, as the next section 
argues. 
Despite such apparent ‘success’ though, the position of the parvenu is impossible. This is 
explored furthest in Arendt’s biography of her alter-ego, Rahel Varnhagen, begun in 1933 
and finally published in 1956 with two additional chapters written with hindsight as to the 
fate of European Jews. Rahel’s story epitomised the absence of collective political struggle 
for rights and how ‘Jews did not … want to be emancipated as a whole; all they wanted was 
to escape from Jewishness, as individuals if possible’ and only failures and ‘shlemihls’ were 
left behind (Arendt 1974:6-7)10. The lesson of Rahel’s story is that ‘to play a part in society 
[i.e. bourgeois salon society]’ nineteenth-century Jews ‘had no choice but to become 
parvenus par excellence’ and Rahel played this part to the full (1974:209). She found in the 
end though that the parvenu ‘will become something’ they ‘did not want to become’ who 
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‘has to acquiesce to everything’ (1974:215). Her attempt to assimilate into Christian literary 
salon society ultimately failed, and, for Arendt, was always doomed to do so. Whilst clearly 
many nineteenth-century Jews did assimilate, Arendt’s concepts of the pariah and parvenu 
signified a relationship to authenticity – the lesson of Rahel’s life was that the parvenu 
attempted inauthentically to conceal a Jewishness of which salon society would ultimately 
remind them, while Rahel’s decision to re-embrace or at least acknowledge her Jewishness 
was a defining moment of authenticity (1974:199). For Rahel ‘the central desire of her life 
had been to escape from Jewishness, and this desire proved unfulfillable because of the 
antisemitism of her milieu, because of the ban, imposed from the outside, against a Jew 
becoming a normal human being’ (Arendt: 1974: 216). Indeed, Rahel found that ‘[t]he world 
became peopled with evil demons who shouted from every corner at every opportunity the 
thing she wished she could conceal forever’ (1974: 220) and she finally salvaged her pariah 
qualities. In the end Rahel reportedly declares ‘The thing which all my life seemed to me the 
greatest shame, which was the misery and misfortune of my life—having been born a 
Jewess—this I should on no account now wish to have missed’ (1974:3). Rahel loved and 
wanted to be loved back and rejected the Jewish world but was in turn rejected by the 
Gentile world (Motzkin 2001). For Arendt this story became an exemplar of the dilemmas of 
Jewish assimilation and subsequently ‘haunted her life’ remaining in the background of her 
analysis in The Human Condition (Birnbaum 2008:223). Rahel realized at the end of her life 
that her ‘liberation’ from Jewishness had come at the cost of self-alienation. This Jewish 
dilemma was expressed later by Bauman (1988) in terms of ‘exit visas’ from ‘national and 
corporate’ existence but without ‘entry tickets’ into the societies in which they lived. The 
emerging constitutional nation-state both claimed adherence to universal principles of 
rights but was legitimated by claims to national identity, which for Jews created a double 
dilemma. There was a conflict between the ‘offer’ of universalist citizenship versus the 
particular identity of Jews as a ‘nation’ whose loyalty to the state would always be in 
question, but also between the nationalist foundation of the state versus the alleged Jewish 
cosmopolitanism.  
The parvenu fails also because of the modern paradox that the more assimilated Jews are 
the harder it becomes to define their ‘foreignness’, yet Jewishness becomes an inextricable 
putative essence. Hence ‘[i]nstead of being defined by nationality or religion, Jews were 
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being transformed into a social group whose members shared certain psychological 
attributes and reactions, the sum total of which was supposed to constitute “Jewishness”’ 
(Arendt 1979: 66). This essence was ‘hidden’ among those who adopted gentile customs 
although, contrary to what Arendt suggests, this did not arise only in the post-
Enlightenment period. The idea of ‘hidden Jews’ is an ancient trope that was central to 
attempts by the Inquisition to expose ‘crypto-Jews’ and goes further back to early Christian 
texts that express suspicion of Jews who have ‘accepted’ the teachings of Christ (e.g. John 
8:31; see Nirenberg 2013: 78ff). Indeed, although Arendt focusses on the post-
enlightenment period, the excluded and abject Jew as pariah is both an ancient and modern 
figure. Weber derives the concept of pariah from the Indian caste system, in which the 
pariah is separated by ritual barriers, exclusion, economic separation, and applies this 
concept to Judaism as a ‘religion of suffering’ that places them outside of history.  
The problem of ancient Jewry, although unique in the socio-historical study of 
religion, can best be understood in comparison with … the Indian caste order. 
Sociologically speaking the Jews were a pariah people, which means … they were a 
guest people who were ritually separated … from their social surroundings. All the 
essential traits of Jewry’s attitude toward the environment can be deduced from this 
pariah existence – especially its voluntary ghetto, long anteceding compulsory 
internment, and the dualistic nature of its in-group and out-group morality (Weber 
1976:3) 
The concept is important in Weber’s sociology as a defence of his Protestant Ethic thesis 
against Smoller’s (as we have seen, typical) view of capitalism as ‘Jewish’. Weber claimed by 
contrast that Jews were pariahs on the margins of the economy while the catalyst for the 
spirit of capitalism had arisen from ascetic Protestant sects. ‘Pariah capitalism’, like the 
Hindu trader castes, Weber says ‘felt at home’ only in the very forms of booty-capitalism 
and trade that the Puritans abhorred (Weber 1976:336-55). However, here again we see a 
melding of the figurative and sociological ‘Jew’. For Weber and Arendt, the Jews were 
pariahs and parasites without country or nation who became marginal ‘middlemen’ and 
politically powerless, a condition intensified in the mid-twentieth century where they are 
now ‘cast up on the shores of strange lands, chased into the cracks of strange economies … 
they are once again parasites’ (2007:75).  
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Arendt further drew on Lazare’s concept of ambivalent pariahdom that had characterised 
Jews in exile after the destruction of the Second Temple (70 CE) – ‘Thus, on the one hand, 
unwillingly, the Jews were unconscious auxiliaries of Christianity while, on the other hand, 
they were its enemies, for which there were numerous reasons’ (Lazare 2005:45). Also 
following Lazare, pariah status was ultimately their responsibility. While their ‘isolation has 
been their weakness’ (2005:23), legal emancipation freed pariahs from servitude but Jews 
themselves had to overcome their self-oppression and break the chains which they had 
‘forged themselves’ (2005:180). In the modern state pariah status was actually intensified 
by their ‘teachers and guides’ who united to keep them in a ‘state of servitude more 
complete than the ancient bondage of Egypt’ (2005:333). By refusing Enlightenment then, 
Jews remained the Other of reason. 
Arendt developed Lazare’s concept but as a largely figurative-literary aesthetic dichotomy of 
the pariah and parvenu. Like Rahel, the parvenu lives in self-abjection and inauthenticity, 
allowed a temporary economic role in Christian society which is politically powerless (as for 
Weber) as war profiteers, hired tax collectors and adjuncts of developing European 
capitalism (Weber, 1967:336-55).  The way of the pariah and parvenu are, Arendt claims, 
‘equally ways of extreme solitude’ because the pariah regrets not having become a parvenu 
and the latter has a bad conscience at having ‘betrayed his people and exchanged equal 
rights for personal privileges’ (Arendt 1979: 66). The pariah is ‘worldless’, that is, apolitical 
and withdraws from engaging with the politics of the dominant society. The unpolitical, 
worldless, non-public character of the community was defined by the demand that it should 
form a ‘body, whose members were to be related to each other like brothers of the same 
family. The structure of communal life was modelled on the relationships between the 
members of a family because these were known to be non-political and even antipolitical’ 
(Arendt 1998:53-4). By contrast the ‘world’ is the ‘in between’, the interaction between 
people and experiences of living together in a public sphere as a space of appearances11. 
They jointly exercise the capacity to think and take charge of history, although this is under 
threat as the ‘public’ increasingly becomes the ‘mass’ (Arendt 2002:235-6). Freedom is 
‘never to let oneself be bound by what one is’ or by a ‘mirror in the other’ (Arendt 2002:93) 
and worldliness not feeling ‘at home’ in the world – being in the world but not of it (Chacón 
2012).   
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By contrast with this secular conception, Scholem (2011) identified a ‘hidden tradition’ of 
mysticism in Kabbalah as a dialectical source of strength. Scholem had shown the 
importance of a ‘hidden tradition’ of spiritual resistance which Arendt (rather like pre-War 
Zionists with whom she was in uneasy alignment) rejected as apolitical worldlessness12. 
Both writers were critics of Jewish assimilation but for Scholem the apparent conservatism 
of Judaism disclosed radical cultural social forces and heretical and revolutionary impulses 
that arose in messianism. The ‘hidden tradition’ has many layers (Sznaider 2011: 26) but 
Arendt agreed with Scholem that in the seventeenth-century Sabbatian movement 
mysticism turned towards political action but after its failure ‘the Jewish body politic died’ 
and led to nihilism (Arendt 2007:310). However, while for Scholem the concealed tradition 
remained hidden in Kabbalah and mysticism, Arendt adopted a more secular concept of 
political action and was disdainful of religiously expressed identity. Suchoff (1997) notes 
that Arendt viewed Scholem’s account of the mystical tradition as both too particularly 
Jewish and as a source of dangerous passivity – something both ‘beautiful’ but also a ‘great 
disaster’. The self-conscious pariah by contrast is one who lives with difference and 
distinctness in such a way as to establish her difference publicly. The self-conscious pariah 
requires visibility, requires to be seen ‘as other’ (Benhabib 1995) and as ‘different’.  The 
pariah must become political as in the Ghetto Uprising 1944 and as illustrated by her 
repeated calls in Aufbau for a Jewish army (e.g. 2007:134-187). In turn Scholem criticised 
Arendt’s concept of action as a betrayal of verborgene Tradition – the concealed tradition 
which was politically active in paradoxical ways (Suchoff 1997). In the Eichmann controversy 
that was to end their friendship, Scholem said to Arendt, ‘At each decisive juncture … your 
book speaks only of the weakness of the Jewish stance in the world’ (Scholem 2012:302)13. 
This indeed was Arendt’s judgement of the ‘passivity’ of Jewish history. To speak as a pariah 
then was to acknowledge Jewish particularly in a secular world and reject the success of 
assimilated parvenus. 
This is a posture Sznaider (2011 passim) identifies with ‘rooted cosmopolitanism’ (combining 
concrete identity with cosmopolitan values) although it is also a disruptive and rebellious 
one. The ‘conscious pariah’ is ‘awake to an awareness of his position … and [has] become a 
rebel’ (Pitkin 1998:63) but paradoxically while rejecting the spiritual ghetto they were 
nonetheless formed by it. The pariah acknowledges the modern condition of loss of 
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traditional bearings but nonetheless insists on separateness – to assert Jewish particularity 
and reject assimilation. Arendt discusses different types of rebellious pariah – Haine’s Lord 
of Dreams; the awkward, visionary shlemihl; the stateless refugee, in constant fear of the 
cop – a figure dramatized by Charlie Chaplin (whom she acknowledged was not Jewish); and 
the ‘man of goodwill’, ‘nobodies’, always excluded, who feature in Kafka’s work, for 
example in The Castle14. A more recent figure of the shlemihl might be Larry Gopnik in the 
Cohen Brothers’ film A Serious Man (2009). While the schnorrer is a fraud seeking self-
interest, the shlemihl is an ironic literary figure who can see through the mask of social 
conventions. The highest form of self-conscious pariahdom is to live in authentic awareness 
that only an outsider embodies the humanity that society otherwise denies (Rabinbach 
1999). As with Lazare, the conscious pariah will rouse fight against all domination and will be 
rejected by antisemites and conventional Jews. According to Rabinbach (1999) the self as 
pariah lives in the authentic awareness that only an outsider embodies the humanity that 
society otherwise denies.   
Her vignettes are informed by an existential concept of responsibility which is central to the 
idea of the conscious pariah. The claim that every pariah who refused to be a rebel was 
partly responsible for their own position contrasts with the Sartrean view of the ‘Jew in the 
eyes of the other’. Arendt did not really dismiss the significance of the stigmatizing gaze, 
since modern antisemitism had ‘very little to do with the Jews’ (2007:75), that is, it was not 
caused by them – although the ‘double pariah’ (as both Jew and rebel) were responsible for 
their own fate. If they fail to rebel they become a schnorrer, a beggar who props up the 
social order, perhaps not unlike Marx’s dismissal of the Lumpenproletariat as ‘knaves’ (Marx 
1977: 316). Thus despite her differences with Sartre (e.g. Bernstein 1996:47-8 and 195-7) 
there is an echo here of the authentic redeeming heroic deed like Mathieu’s moment of 
existential choice when, in the face of the defeat of the French army, he sacrifices his life to 
hold the German advance by fifteen minutes (Sartre 1970:225). For Arendt too the 
authenticity of the act seems more important than its effectiveness. 
It follows then, for Arendt, that ‘Every pariah who refused to be a rebel was partly 
responsible for his own position’ (Arendt, 2007:77) which underlay her controversial claim 
in Eichmann in Jerusalem that the collaboration of the Judenräte was symptomatic of the 
disastrous parvenu strategy of attempting to become ‘favoured Jews’ (Arendt 2006:12) and 
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failure to resist was the ‘darkest chapter in the whole dark story’ (2006:117, emphasis 
added). It is worth noting in passing that although this claim provoked controversy it was 
not new15. Arendt had already said it in the 1950s (1950; 2007: 458); Raul Hilberg (Arendt’s 
main source on the Holocaust) had said it16; and it had been publicised in Israel in the 
Kastner trial17. During the War Jewish partisans such as the Bielski Brigade and Zydowska 
Organizacja Bojowa called on the Judenräte to resist and assassinated members of the 
Jewish Police they believed to be collaborators (Glass 2004; Raffles 2007). More recent 
scholarship has found both evidence of systematic collaboration by the Ghetto Jewish Police 
(Anonymous Members of the Kovno Jewish Ghetto Police 2014) but also of considerably 
more Jewish resistance than Arendt was then aware (e.g. Glass 2004). The existence of 
resistance does not detract from Arendt’s ethics of responsibility to resist or from the claim 
that the Holocaust was in part the outcome of a history of Jewish ‘passivity’ and 
worldlessness. However, the issue of passivity and resistance in Jewish history is central to 
this discussion as is her ability to reconcile general and particular identities. It has been 
suggested (e.g. Postone 2006) that (particularly in Eichmann in Jerusalem) Arendt is 
ultimately unable to address particularity but subsumes it within the abstract general. The 
following section explores some dilemmas of her position and suggests that forms of 
resistance within the Jewish lifeworld point to the limits of advocating purely secular 
defiance.  
Domination, Subordination and the Subaltern 
This section further examines the pariah concept and presents evidence of everyday 
resistances grounded in early modern Jewish religious identities. The separation between 
the social status of parvenus and the political status of the conscious pariah reflects a 
division central to Arendt’s political philosophy which is replicated in the distinction 
between secular and religious. The conscious pariah is a figure of the secular, not religious, 
Jew – as in Lazare’s ‘I am a Jew and I know nothing about Jews. Henceforth I am a Pariah 
and I know not out of what elements to rebuild myself with dignity and a personality’ 
(Lazare 1982:766).  ‘One does not escape Jewishness’ Arendt says in the final chapter of 
Rachel Varnhagen (1974: chap 13) and demands the ‘admission of Jews as Jews to the ranks 
of humanity rather than permit them to ape gentiles or … play the parvenu’ which is a 
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treacherous promise of equality (Arendt 2007:275). The conscious pariah is ‘aware of her 
position’ but what exactly is this awareness?  
Two problems arise here. First, Arendt (like Lazar) calls for Jewish secularism (an end to 
‘worldlessness’) as indeed for Rachel, Judaism had lost all spiritual significance and was 
reduced to a ‘vague humanism’ that had nothing in common with Orthodox Jews or Yiddish 
‘Oriental’ Jews (Birnbaum 2008:232). One might wonder then in what sense a Judaism 
stripped of religiosity would be ‘admitted’ in a form that sustained ‘difference’. Similarly, 
following Arendt, Wellmer (1996: 166) calls for ‘revolutionary particularism’ and Benhabib 
(1996) for the ‘concrete particular’, but it is unclear what will be the culturally defining 
nature of this particularity, other than being a persecuted group with certain ascribed 
characteristics. Sznaider (2011:18) notes that for Arendt ‘being a Jew was … a political 
stance’ and, as she said, an ‘indisputable fact of her life’ but this begs the troubled question 
of the boundaries and markers of Jewish identity (see Diemling and Ray 2016). One source 
of particularity of course was religious difference and Arendt’s lack of interest in Jewish 
religiosity is surprising in view of the complexity of her understanding of Christian 
secularism and thoughts on political theology (Moyn 2008). Whereas Judaism was 
‘worldless’, for Arendt Christianity was ‘political’ and Christian secularism retained 
institutional political forms from the past that beckoned a possible return to religiosity. With 
regard to Judaism it is not just that Arendt ignored its religious components, as Weissberg 
(2007) notes, but that she discounted its potential to generate an ethic of resistance. As 
Jews became secular the ‘more obsessive [their] Jewishness became’ along with a sense of 
either superiority or inferiority but not of being ‘ordinary people’ (Arendt 1979:84). That is, 
Jewishness became a psychological disposition, not an institutional or organizational legacy. 
Yet as Glass shows, armed Jewish resistance in German-occupied Europe had a spiritual 
dimension and while ‘spiritual resistance may not have saved lives, it may have installed a 
psychological refuge inside the self and within the community’ (2004:105). Indeed, in view 
of the ambiguous relationships between Judaism as secular (cultural or ethnic) and religious 
identities we might problematize Arendt’s religious/secular binary. This in some ways 
derived from Zionism’s rejection of the religious, Diaspora, Kaffeehausjuden in favour of the 
new Muskeljuden fighters for the Jewish State. 
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Second, Zolkos (2014), following Bauman, interprets the ‘parvenu and the pariah [to] 
express the nomadic sensibilities and vulnerabilities of the modern era, and are thus 
precursory [sic] to the post-modern nomadic identities of a refugee, a vagabond, a tourist, 
etc’. But the situations of refugees, vagabonds, tourists and whoever else are hardly 
comparable (beyond the trite observation that they are all in some sense ‘mobile’) and 
these sensibilities refer to nothing in particular about the Jewish condition. Differentiation 
and social complexity are crucial to Arendt’s understanding of political resistance but for a 
writer in whose work the ‘in between’ was a central idea, there is little sense of the 
complexity of moral choices and political action. Arendt drew a clear line between the social 
as a space of passivity and discrimination (as in her ‘Reflections on Little Rock’) versus the 
public as one of equality and action (Hammer 1997). Yet if this distinction in Jewish history is 
wrong then perhaps, as Benhabib (1996:166) suggests, the ‘despised terrain of the social’ 
could ‘become the scene of repoliticization’. Further the ethic of resistance might admit 
multiple forms of everyday social practices that are embedded in alternative cultural 
identities, even if they do not manifest as overt heroic opposition. In this sense Scholem’s 
understanding of ‘hidden’ resistances might be more valid than the overly polarized division 
of the social and public in Jewish history. 
The concept of the pariah also needs more scrutiny. Momigliano argues that ‘[m]uch of 
what Weber said on ancient Judaism remains valid’, for example, ‘he duly appreciated the 
whole Messianic dimension as a promise of future rectification of present injustice’ but 
there nonetheless  
remains a curious basic contradiction in [his] analysis of Judaism. More perhaps than 
anybody else he gave importance to its juridical structure – the pact between God 
and the Jewish nation…. [but] did not appreciate the consequence. Throughout the 
centuries this pact remained the foundation of the self-regulation of the Jewish 
communities and therefore saved the Jews from whatever self-abasement can be 
associated with the word pariah (Momigliano 1980:177).  
Further, the depiction ‘pariah’ is not consistent with the level and type of continual 
interaction between Jewish and majority societies. As Zolkos (2014) points out, the analogy 
with the Hindu caste system does not work because there the pariahs were excluded and 
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untouchable and the Brahmins were not looking to them for legitimation. Figurative Judaism 
was needed as a liminal and an ambiguous figure against which Christianity defined itself 
but as we will show below Judaism was also an oppositional subaltern against which 
Christianity defined itself as spirit versus the body of Jewishness.  
Eisenstadt (2009) points out that mutual definitions of ‘otherness’ became central to 
relations between the Jews and dominant Christian and Islamic societies. These definitions 
and continual encounters with each other have played crucial roles in the crystallization of 
Jewish collective consciousness, historical experience, continuity and survival. It is true, as 
Arendt claims, that this involved focus on religious and legal rather than political activity, 
and as Eisenstadt also says, ‘The major – probably the only – institutional arena that could 
be constituted according to the basic tenets of the Jewish cultural vision and tradition was 
that of learning, ritual observance and prayer, and of communal organization’ (Eisenstadt 
2009: 240). However, contrary to Weber, this setting aside of active political participation 
‘did not entail that Jewish communities gave up their civilizational visions, their claim to be a 
civilization of universal significance and the political components connected with this vision’ 
(Eisenstadt 2009: 242). Indeed, the universalistic claims of Halakhic Judaism meant that the 
tension between particularism and universalism was not simply a feature of the modern 
period created only by the demands of assimilation. Rather this was always implicit in the 
duality of particularity and universalism in Judaism. 
Arendt’s view that under rabbinic tradition Judaism condemned itself to powerlessness is 
disputable. Although he refers to Arendt only in passing, David Biale’s account of Jewish 
history similarly argues that the Jewish Question arose with the Enlightenment, dismantling 
of medieval corporations and modern nationalism in which a trade between rights and 
edicts of toleration for loss of identity was possible. However, it was only in the Haskalah 
(Jewish Enlightenment) that a new myth of ‘Jewish powerlessness’ arose (Biale 1986:112). 
Following Arendt, he defines power as the ability to act in concert with others but argues 
that power and the political have always been central features of Jewish life. By contrast 
with Arendt’s passive pariahdom, Biale tells an acutely political history of Judaism which at 
the same time subverts dominant narratives of power and the political. Dominant narratives 
disturb conventional hierarchies – so the younger son is preferred over the elder – Abel over 
Cain, Isaac over Ishmael, Jacob over Esau and Joseph over his brothers (Biale 1986:38). 
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Defeats and exile came to be seen as signs of God’s power but also an opening up of human 
activity that rejected humiliation and subservience and allowed the advocacy of militant 
action, such as the revolts of 115-17 CE in the Roman Diaspora, and the Bar Kokhba 
rebellion (132-35 CE). Although defeated, these revolts were not futile, Biale argues, and 
resulted in the restoration of some autonomous self-government under rabbis and the 
restored Sanhedrin in Jerusalem (1986:53). Again, the Mar Zutra revolt of the Babylonian 
Exilarch created a Jewish kingdom that survived for seven years until defeated by the 
Persians in 520 CE (1986:72). Samuel Ha-Nagid led Muslim armies in Grenada in the 
eleventh century and ‘grasped the relation between force and politics’ (1986:76). Jewish 
communities in Europe in the Middle Ages usually enjoyed internal autonomy in exchange 
for recognition and settlement rights. Biale concludes that in many periods of Diaspora 
history Jews were neither passive subjects, nor what Pitkin calls ‘hapless beneficiaries’ 
(Pitkin 1998:255) but resisted, took up arms and engaged in politics both within the 
community and with Christian authorities. Indeed, Biale says, from biblical times to the 
present day, the Jews have ‘wandered the uncertain terrain between power and 
powerlessness … living with uncertainty and insecurity’ (1986:210). 
Arendt’s public-private distinction coincides with that between authenticity and passivity. 
The social hides responsibility and undermines the capacity for action in a private world of 
thoughtlessness and habit (1998:29). The limitation of Arendt’s analysis arises in part from 
her concept of the social in which she contrasted the social private realm with the political 
realm of public action and never celebrated any transgression of the public and private 
(Pitkin 1998). Indeed, there are, as Benhabib (1995) argued, several layers to Arendt’s 
concept of the social, but in relation to self-conscious resistance the concept of the social is 
undeveloped. The experience of worldlessness was expressed in her depiction of the social 
as ‘the Blob’ – something insidious, unimaginative and threatening, which as Pitkin (1998) 
argues, recalls the portrayal of threats in 1950s science fiction films. The emergence of 
society occurs with the rise of housekeeping, its activities, problems, and organizational 
devices and from ‘the shadowy interior of the household’ enters ‘the light of the public 
sphere’, where it has not only blurred the old borderline between private and political, but 
has also changed ‘almost beyond recognition the meaning of the two terms and their 
significance for the life of the individual and the citizen’ (1998:38). The rise of mass society, 
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on the contrary, indicates that the various social groups have suffered the same absorption 
into one society that the family units had suffered earlier. With the emergence of mass 
society, the realm of the social has ‘reached the point where it embraces and controls all 
members of a given community equally and with equal strength’. But society then ‘equalizes 
under all circumstances’, the victory of which in the modern world is ‘recognition of the fact 
that society has conquered the public realm, and that distinction and difference have 
become private matters of the individual’ (1998:41). The consequence of this is generalized 
worldlessness where our ‘capacity for action and speech has lost much of its former quality 
since the rise of the social realm banished these into the sphere of the intimate and the 
private’ (1998:49). Society is the form in which the fact of mutual dependence for the sake 
of life and nothing else, of sheer survival, assume public significance (1998:46).  
This overly polarized division of the public and the social occludes the cultural and social 
dimensions of resistance within textured relationships in the lifeworld, within which politics 
is nested. If we return to the ‘hidden tradition’ then subordinate groups do not necessarily 
contest subordination openly but rather covertly and often through furtive performances 
that can nonetheless subvert public consent. The private sphere, the home, has been an 
important place for affirmation of Jewish identity since ancient times and destruction of the 
Temple. The liturgy of the home with its daily and weekly prayers, the observance of dietary 
laws, the multitude of laws and customs that regulate observant Jewish life from the 
moment of awakening to the moments of falling asleep. The home is not only the place of 
perpetuating Jewish memory and identity (as in the seder, the Passover home liturgy) but 
also a place for a variety of strategies that affirm Jewish resistance to Christian oppression 
and persecution.  
This can be illustrated by recent research (Deutsch, 2010; Diemling 2011 and 2015; Elyada 
2012) focusing on examples from the early modern period. This period is relevant here since 
for Arendt it was the period of the formation of the market and state and therefore of 
‘society’. The rise of the social resulted in the blurring of the distinction between the private 
and the public – so it was not merely a prelude to the modern but its epitome (Arendt, 
1998:160-61).  Research on the texts of the sixteenth-century convert, Anthonius 
Margaritha18 has highlighted how early modern Jews asserted their sense of self in linguistic 
or ritualistic ways to express their secret opposition to Christian power (Diemling 2011 and 
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2015)  Seemingly trivial everyday acts, expressed as avoidance of Christian spaces or 
symbols or mockery, can be interpreted as acts of resistance that asserted a Jewish sense of 
opposition to Christian power. For example, linguistic strategies that reinterpret Christian 
terms in a derogatory and dismissive way, sometimes as quite witty Hebrew puns and word-
plays, have been used in Jewish culture regarding enemies of the Jewish people for a long 
time (cf. Deutsch, 2010). They serve as a ‘secret code’, which the insiders who are part of 
the community understand. Coded language also undermines the hegemony of the 
powerful majority by distorting a Christian term in a way that often still sounds similar to its 
original meaning, but mocks it and links it to idol worship and impurity.  
Margaritha claimed that Jews cursed nations under whose governments they lived, 
blasphemed Christianity and Jesus in their prayers and resisted the pariah status of 
inferiority to Christians. Margaritha’s ‘ethnographic’ descriptions of Jewish practices include 
for example: 
 The anti-Christian rhetoric of the Hanukkah piyyutim (liturgical poetry) emphasised 
its strongly anti-assimilationist origin – celebrating the Maccabees’ victory against 
the Hellenizing Seleucids. In particular the Maoz Tzur, sung after lighting candles at 
home, includes the stanza calling for revenge upon those who persecute the Jews: 
‘bare Your holy arm/ …Avenge the blood of your servants, take revenge upon the evil 
nation/ … repel the Red one in the deepest shadows’.19 The ‘Red one’, Edom, was 
historically a reference to ancient Rome but here to sixteenth-century Christendom. 
 The Alenu Prayer, part of the daily liturgy, was from the twelfth century onwards a 
‘kind of anti-Christian credo’ (Yuval: 2006, 119) because of the verse ‘for they bow 
down in vanity and emptiness and pray to a God that cannot save’ (adapted from 
Isiah 30:7 and 45:20). Margaritha mentions the Christian censorship of this prayer 
that led to the removal of these controversial passages from Jewish prayerbooks and 
adds that Jews maintained an empty space in their books, reminding the community 
to say these controversial words when praying and spitting out after ‘emptiness’ - a 
Hebrew word play with ‘rik’ (emptiness) and ‘rok’ (saliva).20 This example 
demonstrates subversive practice despite overt compliance to Christian authority. 
The spitting out expresses Jewish disdain of what they understood as Christian 
veneration of ‘graven images’ and a strong feeling of superiority. 
17 
 
While it is true that these examples come from a pre-secular universe they contradict the 
claimed passivity of Diaspora Jewish life and add nuance to Arendt’s grammar of action. 
Outside the intimidating gaze of power, a sharply dissonant political culture is visible 
embedded in everyday practices of the lifeworld. Drawing on Goffman’s analysis of front 
and back stage performances, James Scott (1990) describes how subalterns contest their 
oppressed status secretly ‘behind the scene’ where it is safe to do so. The ‘hidden 
transcript’, the expression of the real feelings of subordinated groups in safe space away 
from the public gaze, allows us to get a sense of the subversive strategies to express anger, 
frustration, hatred or hopes for revenge. Reconstructing such historical subservice strategies 
is notoriously difficult and has only recently been researched. These ‘ethnographic’ 
descriptions of Jews and Judaism, authored by converts from Judaism from the 16th century 
onwards, expose hidden Jewish practices to outsiders, particularly to Christian authorities, 
that shed light on the status of late medieval and early modern Jews, usually considered 
passive victims of Christian oppression and persecution. The concept of passive pariahdom 
then does not capture the ambivalences of Jewish history and identity which is neither 
unambiguously subject nor openly rebellious.  
Conclusion 
Arendt’s concept of the conscious pariah has a prophetic aspect – a potential reversal of the 
statues of both the pariah and parvenu that has been important in understanding the 
politics of resistance. Further, her anti-individualism points towards forms of collective 
action rather than a republic of individuals although in the process the public sphere 
operates as a kind of utopia the potentiality of which was never realized. These concepts 
were rooted in anger and despair at the fate of European Jewry and the growing 
‘worldlessness’ of the world. However, the dichotomy of the pariah/parvenu does not 
encompass the complexity of Jewish-Christian relations but more particularly it 
inadequately understands the dynamics of resistance. Further, the pariahdom from which 
she would emancipate Jews is a combination of sociological and figurative constructions, 
which are in turn related to Arendt’s underdeveloped concept of the social, which is a realm 
of privacy as opposed to the public realm of political action. In the process Arendt 
overlooked or undervalued other forms of cultural and aesthetic resistance. In the context 
of trauma and exile there is urgency to her diagnosis that is also too polarized and castigates 
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the social as a realm of passivity and domesticity. Yet Arendt’s ‘Jewish Question’ – on what 
terms are the Jews to be admitted citizenship? – remains unanswered. If to be a religious 
Jew is to retreat into ‘worldlessness’ and utopia then it is unclear quite what, for Arendt, it 
means to be ‘Jewish’. If it means to enter the public sphere as a secular Jew, like Arendt 
herself for whom ‘being a Jewess was one of the indisputable factual data of my life’, then 
this could be viewed as another route to assimilation. In this case it is not so clear why one 
would want to insist on the concrete particular of Jewishness as opposed to membership of 
a secular republican civic space. At the same time the assertion of Jewish religious identity 
in the Diaspora has been a source of resistance to pariahdom and she perhaps dismissed too 





1 The distinction between the figurative and sociological Jew does not mean the former is 
unreal, on the contrary it has real consequences.  
2 The term ‘witness’ is used cautiously here – these writers were not directly witnesses to 
the mass extermination, however, Arendt was imprisoned in Camp Gurs in 1940 and those 
who did not escape were eventually deported to death camps. Arendt was then survivor of 
a process that she documented from the 1930s. 
3 Of those who escaped she said, ‘They must remember that they are constantly on the run, 
and that the world’s reality is actually expressed by their escape… [the] personal strength 
of the fugitives increases as the persecution and danger increase’. (Arendt 1968) 
4 In 1942 she said, ‘The extermination of the Jews of Europe … is about to begin. The murder 
of five thousand Jews in each of the cities of Berlin, Vienna and Prague is to mark the start 
of this mass slaughter (2007:162; and again pp 191-2 and pp 214-7). It is not often noted 
that Arendt publicised the genocide while the Allies were still dismissing evidence of them. 
5 There are other similarities between Arendt and Simmel’s understanding a society of 
strangers mediated by money (see Birnbaum 2004:123-68). 
6 This was a derogatory term for people working in the stock exchange. 
7 Marx also used the term ‘parvenu’ to describe assimilated Jews involved in finance (Marx 
to Engels 30/7/1862) 
8 It would be interesting to explore a dialogue between Arendt and Durkheim on the 
possible solidaristic bases for human rights. 
9 This is a charitable way of putting it. Laqueur (2001) claimed that Arendt had read ‘too 
much antisemitic literature for her own good’. 
10 Shlemihl (Yiddish) is an awkward, unfortunate person. 
11 It might be thought that the concept of the public used here is anachronistic but it follows 
Arendt’s usage of the term as a sphere of speech and action that pre-dates modernity 
where, actually it is increasingly compromised.  
12 It is fashionable to regard Arendt as now an ‘anti-Zionist’ (e.g. Butler 2014) but her 
relationship with Zionism was complex. Her insistence on the impossibility of assimilation 
had resonance with Hertz’s view of the inevitability of antisemitism. Similarly, Zionists 
dismissed Diaspora history as passive and impotent ‘ghost people’ adopting a posture of 
kiddush ha-shem, allowing oneself to be killed for the sanctification of God. She became 
more critical of Zionism in the 1950s, though ambivalently so, thus Parvikko’s (1996:170) 
claim that Arendt ‘was never a Zionist’ does not bear scrutiny. 
13 In the same passage he accused Arendt of lack of Ahavat Yisrael (love of the Jewish 
people). 
14 Scholem also saw Kafka’s stories as allegories of the Jewish condition, although it is 
unclear to what extent K in The Castle was a pariah or parvenu – he had contempt for the 
peasants in whom he has ‘no interest’ (2009:26) and was obsessed with entry into the 
castle. 
15 There were of course other reasons for the controversy. Her concept of ‘banality of evil’ 
and claiming that Eichmann was no fanatical antisemite still provoke controversy while her 
account of the trial omits witness testimonials, which endowed the trial with historical 
significance. But consideration of these issues is beyond the scope of this paper. 
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16 Hilberg (1961: 16-17) had written of the failure to resist as an ‘alleviation-compliance 
response’ and similarly Arendt wrote of ‘Diaspora mentality’ that was indifferent to 
survival or death. 
17 In 1947 Malchiel Gruenwald who lost 52 relatives in Auschwitz accused Rudolf Kastner, a 
Hungarian lawyer, journalist and later Israeli civil servant, of collaborating with the Nazis in 
Hungary. Kastner sued for libel but the judge ruled in Gruenwald's favour. Kastner was 
assassinated in Tel Aviv in March 1957. Parts of the verdict were overturned by the Israeli 
Supreme Court in 1958. 
18 Anthonius Margaritha was a sixteenth-century Jewish Hebraist and convert to Christianity. 
He was a source for Martin Luther's conception of Judaism. The texts of converts (also 
including Victor of Carben, Johannes Pfefferkorn and Ernst Hess) were designed to convey 
negative images of Jews to Christian audiences but for our purposes serve to illustrate daily 
resistances to pariah status. 
19 Anthonius Margaritha, Der Gantz Jüdisch Glaub, Augsburg 1530, fol. G1v-G2r.  
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